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Abstract:
In line with a general trend in contemporary global governance, the World Trade
Organization has been developing increased links with civil society groups. If conducted well,
these contacts can make important contributions towards greater effectiveness and democracy in
the global trade regime. If handled poorly, however, the relations can undermine policy and
undercut democracy. Already the WTO and civic associations have taken notable steps to
increase the quantity and quality of their mutual exchanges. Yet major resource constraints and
deeper structural impediments have to date prevented a fuller development of this dialogue.
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Global Governance and Civil Society
The creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) has reflected and reinforced an
important structural shift, in the face of large-scale globalization, from statist to post-
sovereign governance. At the close of the twentieth century, regulatory activities are
no longer always centred on or subordinated to the state. Instead, much governance
has become spread across a host of substate (e.g. municipal and provincial), state, and
suprastate (e.g. regional and transworld) institutions, as well as a number of private
organizations such as credit-rating agencies and foundations. None of these sites of
authority holds a clear, complete and consistent primacy over the others.1
Contemporary accelerated growth of supraterritorial flows has made sovereignty (in its
traditional sense of absolute, supreme, comprehensive, unilateral state control over a
given territorial jurisdiction) unworkable. Recent intensified globalization has broken
the Westphalian mould of politics. To be sure, the end of sovereignty has in no way
meant the end of the state. On the contrary, many states (especially those of the OECD
countries) have in recent history grown in size, acquired new policy instruments, and
expanded their competences. However, the unprecedented proliferation since mid-
century of global communications, global ecological problems, global finance, global
production, global markets, global organizations and global consciousness has made
sovereign statehood impracticable.
In these circumstances, regulators have devised numerous substate, suprastate and
private-sector mechanisms to supplement or even in some respects to supersede rule
by states.2 A key challenge in our contemporary globalizing world is to construct
                                                 
1These and the following general points are elaborated in J.A. Scholte, 'The Globalization of World
Politics', in J. Baylis and S. Smith (eds), The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to
International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 13–30; Scholte, 'Global
Capitalism and the State', Int rnational Affairs, vol. 73, no. 3 (July 1997), pp. 427–52; Scholte,
'Globalisation and Governance', in P. Hanafin (ed.), Identity, Rights and Constitutional
Transformation (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishers, forthcoming).
2See, with respect to the WTO, M. Hart, 'The WTO and the Political Economy of Globalization',
Journal of World Trade, vol. 31, no. 5 (October 1997), pp. 75–93; A. Tita, 'Globalization: A New
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effective and democratic governance out of what has become multilayered and often
fragmented authority. How can policy formulation, implemention and review be
properly coordinated in decentred governance? How can post-sovereign conditions be
fashioned to yield adequate popular participation, open debate, consultation and
representation as well as transparency and democratic accountability?
The WTO is a prominent instance of growing suprastate governance in the globalizing
world of the late twentieth century.3 The new organization has given transworld
regulation of trade a permanent institutional framework. The WTO's remit has rapidly
expanded to cover not only cross-border movements of manufactures, but also trade in
agricultural products and various services, intellectual property issues, foreign direct
investment, trade and environment questions, competition policy, and more. The WTO
Trade Policy Review Body conducts periodic suprastate surveillance of member
governments' commercial measures. The organization's Dispute Settlement Body
received over a hundred complaints during its first three years of operation, while the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) faced less than a hundred cases
during the preceding half-century.
Although the operations and authority of the WTO integrally involve states, the global
trade regime also has some relative autonomy from and power over the governments
that subscribe to it. For one thing, the forces of globalizing markets and currently
prevailing ideologies have been such that states are heavily constrained to join the
WTO. Although, formally, membership has been a matter of 'sovereign choice', in
effect governments have had little option but to approve the Uruguay Round accords.
Moreover, by Article XVI (4) of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
                                                                                                                                
Political and Economic Space Requiring Supranational Governance', J urnal of World Trade, vol. 32,
no. 3 (June 1998), pp. 47–55.
3See, e.g., B.M. Hoekman and M.M. Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System:
From GATT to WTO (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); J. Croome, Reshaping the World
Trading System: A History of the Uruguay Round (Geneva: World Trade Organization, 1995); A.O.
Krueger (ed.), The World Trade Organization as an International Institution(Ch cag : University of
Chicago Press, 1997); J.H. Jackson, The World Trade Organisation (L don: Cassell, 1998).
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Trade Organization, member-states commit themselves to alter their laws, regulations
and administrative procedures to conform with the suprastate trade regime.4 Alleged
violations of WTO rules are considered by panels of experts whose decisions are
binding unless every state party to the global trade regime (including the initial
complainant) votes to overturn the advice.5 Already, even powerful states like Japan
and the USA have received guilty verdicts from the WTO. More broadly, too, the
consensus principle that prevailed in GATT operations from 1948 to 1994 has given
way to a majority vote principle in its successor.6 In addition, states may not make any
reservations in respect of their membership of the WTO.7
Not surprisingly, given this substantial growth in both the range and the authority of
global trade law, many civic groups have developed considerable interest in the WTO.
As an important influence on the distribution of resources worldwide, the institution
has come to occupy a prominent place on the agenda of numerous business lobbies,
labour unions, farmers organizations, environmentalist groups, women's associations,
development cooperation groups, consumer unions, human rights advocates, think
tanks, and other elements of civil society. Many of these nonstate actors have sought
direct contact with the WTO, bypassing government authorities in order to interrogate
and lobby the multilateral institution itself.
This increase in approaches from civic organizations to the WTO has flowed in part
from the recent enormous growth in civil society across most of the world. In the
present context, 'civil society' refers to a broad collectivity of non-governmental, non-
commercial, more or less formal organizations. It encompasses all those groups that,
from outside official circles and firms (though sometimes closely linked with them),
                                                 
4The Results of the Uruguay Round (Ge eva: World Trade Organization, n.d.), p. 17.
5Ibid, pp. 405, 417. For further details see E.-U. Petersmann, The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement
System: International Law, International Organizations, and Dispute Settlement (London: Kluwer
Law International, 1997), ch. 5.
6Article IX (1) – see Results of the Uruguay Round, p. 11.
7Article XVI (5) – see ibid, p. 17.
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pursue objectives that relate explicitly to reinforcing or altering existent rules, norms
and/or deeper social structures.
One leading researcher of civil society has described (albeit perhaps with some
hyperbole) 'a global "associational revolution" that may prove to be as significant to
the latter twentieth century as the rise of the nation-state was to the latter nineteenth'.8
For example, in the 1990s Kenya has counted some 23,000 registered women's groups,
and more than 25,000 registered grassroots organizations have operated in the state of
Tamil Nadu in India.9 Significant parts of this expanding civil society have involved
transborder affiliations. The number of active transborder civic groups (e.g. of
religious believers, professionals, human rights campaigners, etc.) has increased more
than tenfold since 1960, to a total of 16,000 in 1997.10 Many local and national civic
organizations, too, have incorporated global networking into their activities.
Since the 1970s, most of the major public global governance agencies have
experienced a notable growth of direct exchanges with local, national and transborder
civic associations.11 Almost all organs of the United Nations system have acquired
expanded external relations departments, and many UN agencies have instituted liaison
committees with participants from civil society. Proposals have furthermore circulated
for the creation of a UN People's Assembly composed of civil society representatives
next to the General Assembly of state delegates. Already civic groups have in the
1990s convened global meetings with fair regularity, for example, alongside the Group
of Seven summits, the Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
the World Bank, and ad hoc UN conferences on various global issues. A broad
                                                 
8L.M. Salamon, 'The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector', Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 4 (July-August 1994),
p. 109.
9United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1997 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1997), pp. 96–7.
10Union of International Associations, Yearbook of International Organizations 1997/98. Volume I
(Munich: Saur, 1997), pp. 1762–3.
11See further P. Willetts (ed.), 'Conscience of the World': The Influence of Non-Governmental
Organisations in the UN System (London: Hirst, 1996); T.G. Weiss and L. Gordenker (eds), NGOs,
the UN, and Global Governance (Boulder: Rienner, 1996).
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consensus has by now emerged that civil society and global governance institutions
should have relations with each other. On the other hand, there is far less clarity, let
alone agreement, on how these relations should be conducted, and to what ends.
Given this wider context of contemporary world politics, WTO staff and national trade
ministry officials ought not to have been surprised to encounter substantial civil society
interest in the new multilateral organization. Indeed, a prominent business association,
the World Economic Forum (WEF), was instrumental in launching the Uruguay Round
of trade negotiations that produced the WTO. Major gatherings of civic groups have
accompanied each of the two WTO Ministerial Conferences held to date: at Singapore
in December 1996; and at Geneva in May 1998. Civil society organizations have
furthermore undertaken studies of the WTO, disseminated information about the new
organization, arranged policy dialogues with WTO staff, and so on.
The Marrakesh Agreement of 1994 in fact explicitly acknowledges interest and
involvement by civil society in the WTO. Article V (2) stipulates that the new agency
should make 'appropriate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-
governmental organizations'.12 The GATT never acted on similar provisions in the
(unratified) Havana Charter of 1948 for 'consultation and co-operation with non-
governmental organizations'.13 In contrast, the General Council of the WTO has
already (in July 1996) elaborated formal guidelines for increased relations with
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).14 In July 1998 the Director-General, Renato
Ruggiero, announced further measures to improve contacts with civic groups.15
                                                 
12Results of the Uruguay Round, p. 9.
13Cited in S. Charnovitz and J. Wickham, 'Non-Governmental Organizations and the Original
International Trade Regime', Journal of World Trade, vol. 29, no. 5 (October 1995), p. 115.
14'Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental Organisations', WT/L/162, 23
July 1996 – cited in M. Williams, 'The World Bank, the World Trade Organisation and the
Environmental Social Movement, in R. O'Brien et al., Complex Multilateralism: The Global
Economic Institution-Global Social Movement Nexus (Unpublished report, February 1998), p. 109.
15'Ruggiero Announces Enhanced WTO Plan for Cooperation with NGOs', WTO Press Release 107
dated 17 July 1998.
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The remainder of this paper examines contacts between civil society and the World
Trade Organization in greater detail. The next section considers both the potential
opportunities and the potential dangers that relations between the WTO and civil
society present. The third section of the paper eviews the aims and activities of civic
organizations who have developed interests in the WTO, while the fourth section
assesses the overtures made to date by the WTO towards civil society. A fifth section
notes remaining shortfalls in the WTO-civil society dialogue, while a sixth section
highlights some of the constraints which have to date inhibited a fuller development of
these relationships. The final section looks to the future.
Benefits and Pitfalls
Before examining specific relationships between the World Trade Organization and
civil society, it is good to reflect in general terms on the possible effects of those
exchanges. Civil society is inherently neither good nor evil. It can both improve and
harm policy. It can both enhance and detract from democracy. In short, civil society's
contributions to post-Westphalian governance depend very much on the particular
features of individual civic associations and official institutions and the wider
sociohistorical conditions in which these actors operate.
Unlike the World Bank and UN development agencies, the WTO does not engage so-
called 'operational' civic groups in the delivery of services. However, civil society
offers the global trade regime at least six other potential benefits:
(1) civic associations can provide the WTO with information (both data
and analysis) that is useful in policy formulation, implementation and
review.
(2) civil society groups can stimulate debate about WTO policies,
particularly by offering alternative perspectives, methodologies and
proposals. Such challenges push the WTO better to clarify, explain,
justify and perhaps rethink its positions.
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(3) civic organizations can provide channels through which stakeholders
may voice their views on trade issues and have those opinions relayed
to WTO staff. With this input officials can better guage the political
viability of proposed measures or programmes.
(4) civic associations can play an important role in democratically
legitimating (or indeed delegitimating) WTO activities. For example,
civil society can influence the respect accorded (or denied) to WTO
views and the ratification (or rejection) of WTO-sponsored trade
agreements.
(5) civil society bodies can serve as important agents of civic education,
increasing public understanding of the WTO and its policies. Many
civic associations have in this vein prepared handbooks and
information kits, organized workshops, circulated newsletters, written
press articles, maintained Internet sites, developed curricular material
for schools, and so on.
(6) relations between the WTO and civic associations can reverberate to
have more general democratizing effects. For example, citizens' groups
that are denied access to their national governments may be able to
gain a voice through global channels such as the WTO.
However, the benefits just reviewed do not flow automatically. If badly organized and
executed, relations between civil society and the WTO can also have detrimental
effects on policy and democracy in the global trade regime. In a negative vein:
(1) the collection of civic associations that develops relations with the
WTO might not adequately or fairly represent the various
constituencies with a stake in the global trade regime. Civic contacts
could thereby reproduce and even enlarge inequalities and arbitrary
privileges connected with nationality, class, race, gender, religion, and
so on.
(2) the WTO could treat overtures to civil society as merely a public
relations exercise. The institution would thereby not only miss out on
the valuable inputs indicated above, but also alienate many if not most
of its potential civic partners.
(3) interventions from civil society into global governance of trade could
be misdirected and/or ill-informed. Such low-quality involvement can
unhelpfully disrupt institutional operations and policy development.
(4) the WTO could through its exchanges with civic groups become
embroiled in local and national politics of which it has little
understanding, perhaps undermining democracy in the process.
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(5) the WTO could focus its exchanges with civil society on supportive
groups to the neglect of challengers. As a result, the institution would
get a false sense of popular endorsement of its policies. Indeed, such
marginalization of critics (deliberate or unconscious) could generate a
severe backlash against the global trade regime.
In sum, relations between civil society and the WTO can have far-reaching
consequences – positive or negative – for the design and operation of the global trade
regime. Given the previously described dynamics of politics in the contemporary
globalizing world, it seems most unlikely that contacts between the WTO and civic
associations will decline, let alone disappear. On the contrary, most indications suggest
that these interchanges will further proliferate in the years to come. The challenge
before the WTO and civil society is therefore to develop their mutual relationships in
ways that minimize the pitfalls and maximize the benefits outlined above.
Civic Interest in the WTO
Civil society encompasses huge diversity. The multitude of civic associations exhibit
widely differing constituencies, institutional forms, sizes, geographical coverage,
resource levels, organizational cultures, orientations, goals, and tactics. In short, due
caution is necessary when generalizing about civil society groups.
That said, we may loosely distinguish three types of civic organizations in terms of
their general approach to the WTO. One group, whom we might call 'conformers',
accept the established discourses of trade theory and broadly endorse the existing aims
and activities of the WTO. A second group, whom we might call 'reformers', accept
the need for a global trade regime, but seek to change reigning theories, policies and/or
operating procedures. A third category of civic associations, whom we might call
'radicals', seek to reduce the WTO's competences and powers or even to abolish the
institution altogether.
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Corporate business associations, commercial farmers' unions and economic research
institutes have usually taken a conformist approach to the WTO. Prominent business
groups that have supported the WTO-based global trade regime include the
aforementioned WEF, the International Chamber of Commerce, and the European
Round Table of industrialists. With a narrower agenda, the US Dairy Foods
Association, the Pork Producers Council, the National Farmers' Alliance, and the
American Sugar Alliance have urged a rapid liberalization of trade in agricultural
products.16 Think tanks that have promoted a broadly conformist line on the WTO
include the Brookings Institution and the Institute for International Economics.17
This is not to say that conformist civic organizations have approved of each WTO rule,
procedure and decision. On the contrary, business lobbies have frequently sought to
revise or overturn a WTO measure to their commercial advantage, and mainstream
researchers have often queried certain WTO actions and analyses. However, these
disagreements have remained within the conventional framework of trade debates,
namely, on a spectrum running from liberalism to mercantilism. Conformists therefore
'speak the same language' as WTO staff and most national trade officials. For these
circles, arguments about trade regulation do not go beyond issues concerning the
balance between free trade and protectionism and the degree and speed of
liberalization. Conformers only interrogate the outputs of the existing global trade
regime, not its foundations.
In contrast, reformers in civil society aim to change the thinking, rules and procedures
of the WTO. Most reformist activities have sought to redress alleged undesirable
effects of the existent trading order: e.g. in respect of labour conditions,
underdevelopment of the South, environmental degradation, consumer protection, and
                                                 
16http://www.ictsd.org/html/special.htm, p. 8.
17Cf. S. Collins and B. Bosworth (eds), The New GATT: Implications for the United States
(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1995); the Conference on the Future of the World Trading
System, Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC, April 1998.
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gender inequalities. Many of these lobbyists have concurrently campaigned for a
democratization of WTO operations: e.g. in terms of wider participation and greater
public release of information.
Trade unions and human rights advocates have spurred efforts to incorporate
protective labour standards into the global trade regime.18 These r formers maintain
that trade liberalization coupled with market globalization has greatly weakened the
power of workers vi -à-vis managers and investors. In order to safeguard basic labour
rights and restore a fair balance of class interests – so these civic groups argue – the
WTO needs a social clause that commits states to respect seven key conventions of the
International Labour Organization (ILO).19 eading voices from organized labour in
this campaign have included the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
(ICFTU), the World Confederation of Labour, and several International Trade
Secretariats. Certain human rights groups have also engaged the WTO on issues of
labour protection: e.g. the Washington-based International Labor Rights Fund; the
Montreal-based International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development;
and the Brussels-based SOLIDAR alliance. Significantly, some trade unions and NGOs
in the Third World have viewed this lobbying with scepticism as an effort to perpetuate
the privileges of workers in the North at the expense of development in the South.20
Indeed, many development NGOs with interests in global economic governance have
expanded their advocacy work beyond the Bretton Woods institutions and UN
development agencies to encompass the WTO as well. Given that WTO rules severely
restrict the autonomy in trade policy of already weak states in the South, these civic
groups have worried that the Uruguay Round and subsequent accords might well
compromise possibilities for equitable human development. Prominent NGOs in trade-
                                                 
18The following paragraph is largely adapted from R. O'Brien, 'The WTO and Labour', in O'Brien et
al., pp. 59–84.
19See J. Evans, 'The Trade Union's View on International Labour Standards: A Comment', in P. van
Dijck and G. Faber (eds), Challenges to the New World Trade Organization (The Hague: Kluwer Law
International, 1996), pp. 291–7.
20O'Brien, pp. 71–3.
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and-development debates have included Oxfam, Third World Network, and the
Harare-based International South Group Network.21 These issues have also occupied
a number of development think tanks, including the North-South Institute (Ottawa),
the Brazilian Institute for Social and Economic Analysis (IBASE, Rio de Janeiro), and
so on.
Some of the most persistent efforts in civil society to reform the WTO have come from
environmental NGOs.22 These critics maintain that a liberal trade regime tends to
exacerbate ecological degradation: (a) by encouraging a relaxation of national
environmental protection measures in order to maintain international competitiveness;
(b) by promoting production for export (more environmentally damaging) rather than
for home consumption; (c) by stimulating, with increased exports, unsustainable levels
of natural resource exploitation; and (d) by (implicitly) sanctioning trade in toxic
wastes. Environmentalists have sought, firstly, to get sustainable development
concerns on the WTO agenda and, secondly, to institute restrictions on trade where it
causes ecological damage. Leading reformist environmental NGOs in dialogue with the
WTO have included the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development
(ICTSD, established at Geneva in September 1996), the World Conservation Union
(IUCN), the World Wide Fund for Nature, the International Institute for Sustainable
Development, and the Center for International Environmental Law.
A fourth issue of notable concern in campaigns to reform the WTO has been consumer
protection. Advocates in this area argue that the existing liberal global trade regime has
greatly enhanced the power of large (usually transborder) firms. They affirm that
global competition policy and a binding code of conduct for global companies are
needed to constrain this corporate power in the public interest. Prominent civic
                                                 
21Cf. B. Coote, The Trade Trap: Poverty and the Global Commodities Markets (Oxfo d: Oxfam,
1996); C. Raghavan et al., 'Globalisation or Development', Third World Resurgence, no. 74 (October
1996), pp. 11–34; Y. Tandon, 'The WTO: A Southern NGO Perspective' (May 1998), at
http://www.ictsd.org/html/review2-3.1/htm.
22See Williams, pp. 108–18.
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associations in this campaign have included UK-based Consumers International, India-
based CUTS, and the International Organization of Consumer Unions.
Meanwhile certain other NGOs have sought to bring gender awareness to the WTO.
Employing feminist political economy, they are concerned that the global trade regime,
like the modern economy generally, contains structural biases against women.23 Some
voices in the global women's movement have therefore called inter alia for gender
assessments of WTO rules and for attention to gender issues in the WTO's trade policy
reviews.24 These associations created an Informal Working Group on Gender and
Trade at the Singapore Ministerial Conference and convened again at the Geneva
Ministerial Conference.25 Prominent actors in these (to date fairly limited) efforts have
included the New York-based Women's Environment and Development Organization
(WEDO) and the Brussels-based campaign, Women in Development Europe (WIDE).
WEDO has produced several booklets on the global trade regime, and WIDE
organized a Women and Trade Conference at Bonn in May 1996.26
The issues discussed so far relate to policy content, but many civic activists have
sought also to change the operating procedures of the WTO. In particular they have
advocated a democratization of the organization by giving citizens increased access to,
and influence in, its proceedings and decisions.27 Some reformers have argued in this
vein that relevant representatives in civil society should participate directly in WTO
policy deliberations, trade policy reviews, and dispute settlement procedures.28
                                                 
23Cf. S. Joekes and A. Weston, Women and the New Trade Regime (New York: UNIFEM, 1995);
A.K. Mehta and C. Otto, Global Trading Practices and Poverty Alleviation in South Asia: A Gender
Perspective (New York: UNIFEM, 1996).
24Cf. 'World Trade and the Rights of Women', Women Working World Wide Bulletin, no. 2 (January
1997).
25http://www.idtsd.org/html/special.htm
26Who Makes the Rules? Decision-Making and Structure of the World Trade Organization (New
York: WEDO, 1995); How Secure Is Our Food? Food Security and Agriculture under the New GATT
and WTO (New York: WEDO, 1995); Who Owns Knowledge? Who Owns the Earth? Intellectual
Property Rights and Biodiversity under the New GATT and WTO (New York: WEDO, 1995).
27Cf. C. Bellmann and R. Gerster [Swiss Coalition of Development Organizations], 'Accountability in
the World Trade Organization', Journal of World Trade, vol. 30, no. 6 (December 1996), pp. 31–74.
28Cf. S. Bullen and B. Van Dyke, In Search of Sound Environment and Trade Policy: A Critique of
Public Participation in the WTO (Geneva: Center for International Environmental Law, 1996).
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Pursuing a complementary line, the Swiss Coalition of Development Organizations has
urged the establishment of a WTO Parliament with legislative competence or, in the
interim, the formation of a parliamentary group with an advisory role vis-à-visthe
WTO.29 Other proposals have called for a more transparent WTO, that is, one which
has open hearings, increased (and more timely) publication of official documents, and
greater dissemination of information, particularly in the South.30
Whereas reformers aim in one way or another to alter the WTO, radicals in civil
society regard the existing global trade regime as incorrigible. They therefore advocate
its contraction (e.g. back to the original parameters of the GATT) or complete
abolition. In the mid-1990s, radical groups campaigned against ratification of both the
Uruguay Round accords and the North American Free Trade Agreement. In February
1998 many of the same opponents formed a loose worldwide network called Peoples'
Global Action against 'Free' Trade and the World Trade Organization. The PGA has
called openly for 'the disappearance of the WTO'.31 Its rejectionist stance may be
broadly likened to the position of the 50 Years Is Enough coalition towards the IMF
and the World Bank. Indeed, participation in the two networks has overlapped to some
extent. Radical circles also include environmentalists like Greenpeace who – in
contrast to the reformist associations named earlier – refuse to talk with the WTO.
The preceding survey amply confirms the observation made at the start of this section
that civil society relations with the WTO encompass a large diversity of organizations,
activities and approaches. The distinction of conformist, reformist and radical groups is
not always neat in practice, of course. For example, some economic research institutes
have straddled conformist and reformist positions. Meanwhile many development
NGOs have fluctuated between radical and reformist positions. Nevertheless, the
                                                 
29http://www.ictsd.org/html/special.htm, p. 2.
30Cf. the collective NGO submission, coordinated through the Dialogues Programme of the ICTSD,
in July 1998 on 'Openness, Transparency and Access to Documents in the WTO' (source: e-mails
circulated by ICTSD in June 1998).
31PGA press release, 18 May 1998. See the PGA website: http://www.agp.org
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three-way categorization of conformers, reformers and radicals remains analytically
useful in mapping the politics of civil society in regard to the WTO.
WTO Overtures to Civil Society
How has the World Trade Organization reacted to the various initiatives from civil
society associations described above? The institution has during its short history
already taken some steps to implement Article V of the Marrakesh Agreement. In
brief, the WTO has: (a) adjusted its language to recognize civil society; (b) undertaken
various outreach initiatives towards civic associations; (c) increased its public
dissemination of information; and (d) made some alterations to substantive policy that
(partly) meet civil society demands. These four positive developments are detailed
below. On the other hand, as the next section will elaborate, the WTO has to date done
relatively little to institutionalize relationships with civil society or to involve civic
associations directly in policy deliberations. Nor has the organization so far made much
use of contacts with civil society to guage the political viability of its policies.
In its discourse, the WTO has joined other global governance agencies in
acknowledging the importance of civil society inputs to policy. For example, in his
address to the Singapore Ministerial Conference, Ruggiero highlighted the presence of
many 'representatives of non-governmental organizations, the business sector, and the
media'. He went on to argue that:32
a world trading system which has the support of a knowledgeable and
engaged global community will be in a far stronger position to manage
the forces of globalization for everyone's benefit.
                                                 
32Cited in Hart, p. 77n.
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At the Geneva Ministerial Conference, too, Ruggiero and several government leaders
publicly endorsed the idea of increased relations between the WTO and civil society.33
In this vein President Clinton of the USA proposed 'a forum where business, labour,
environmental and consumer groups can speak out and help guide the further evolution
of the WTO'.34 At a time when UN bodies and the Bretton Woods institutions are
continually speaking of 'stakeholders', 'ownership' and 'participatory development', the
WTO can hardly speak another language.
The shift in discourse has been more than rhetorical insofar as the WTO has taken
various initiatives to establish dialogue with civic groups. Its staff has provided many
briefings to and received multiple representations from business associations, labour
unions and NGOs. More elaborately, the Secretariat has since June 1994 organized
four annual symposia with representatives of civil society on trade and sustainable
development issues.35 In September 1997 two dozen NGOs from four continents
participated in a Joint WTO/UNCTAD Symposium on Trade-Related Issues Affecting
Least-Developed Countries.36 At the Ministerial Conferences the WTO has provided
civil society representatives with office space and media facilities.37
The organization has also responded to demands from civil society for greater release
of information concerning WTO policymaking. The production of official publications
has expanded, and staff have since 1995 constructed an elaborate website.38 In July
1996 the General Council adopted Procedures for the Circulation and De-Restriction
of WTO Documents.39 Under these guidelines, reports of dispute panels are now
                                                 
33http://www.ictsd.org/html/special.htm, p. 3.
34'Clinton Endorses Call for High-Level WTO Meeting on Trade-Environment and Calls for WTO
Openness', Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, vol. 2, no. 18 (18 May 1998).
35Williams, p. 110; http://www.ictsd.org/html/review2-3.7.htm
36http://www.wto.org/wto/develop/hlm5.htm
37O'Brien, 'The WTO and Labour', p. 76.
38http://www.wto.org
39WT/L/160/Rev.1, 22 July 1996; see also L.B. Van Dyke and J.B. Weiner, An Introduction to the
WTO Decision on Document Restriction (Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable
Development/Center for International Environmental Law, n.d.).
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made public as soon as they are adopted. The WTO also publishes completed trade
policy review reports and summaries of the proceedings of the Committee on Trade
and Environment. Some important documentation continues to be restricted, but the
WTO releases far more information than the GATT ever made available. As one NGO
representative recently described the situation, 'The WTO has evolved from opaque to
translucent'.40 At the Second Ministerial Conference, Ruggiero pledged to consider
how moves towards greater transparency could be taken further.41 Following the
measures announced in July 1998, the WTO Secretariat has alerted member
governments to all documents, position papers and newsletters submitted to it by civic
organizations.42
Several other turns in WTO policy have also responded to demands from civil society.
For example, the expansion of trade liberalization measures to cover intellectual
property matters, telecommunications, financial services and so on has (at least partly)
met the wishes of various business lobbies. On another front, the WTO has sought to
appease trade unions by putting labour standards on its agenda and by deepening its
collaboration with the ILO. In response to development questions, the WTO has
maintained a Committee on Trade and Development and in October 1997 convened a
High-Level Meeting for Least-Developed Countries. In recognition of ecological
concerns, ministers assembled at Marrakesh decided to launch a wide-ranging work
programme on trade and environment in the WTO. (In contrast, the GATT Group on
Environmental Measures and International Trade, formed in 1971, met only once, in
1993 to discuss the results of the UN Conference on Environment and
Development.43) On questions of unfair business practices in global markets, the
Singapore Ministerial Conference established a WTO working party to study the
interaction between trade and competition policy. These and other policy
                                                 
40http://www.ictsd.org/html/review2-3.7.htm, p. 1.
41http://www.wto.org/wto/anniv/dgen.htm; also 'Draft Ministerial Text Submitted by the Director-
General at the Second Ministerial Meeting', Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, vol. 2, no. 18 (18
May 1998).
42WTO Press Release 107, op cit.
43Williams, pp. 114–15.
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developments have often fallen short of what civic groups (reformists in particular) aim
for,44 but changes there have been.
Shortfalls in Relations
Contributions from civil society to the global trade regime have clearly increased in
both quantity and quality in the 1990s. Nevertheless, major additional advances would
be required before civic inputs could realize their full potential (on the lines described
earlier) to increase policy effectiveness and democracy in the World Trade
Organization. The following paragraphs outline three major shortcomings in current
relations between civic associations and the WTO, namely, unequal access,
shallowness, and limited reciprocity. These flaws have caused WTO-civil society
exchanges to suffer significantly from the possible pitfalls noted earlier.
A first major way that WTO-civil society contacts have thus far failed to maximize
their potential contributions to policy enhancement relates to biased participation. The
various elements of civil society have not enjoyed equal opportunities to engage with
the WTO. In a rough ranking, conformers like business associations have usually had
easiest access. Thus, for example, 65 per cent of the civic organizations accredited to
attend the Singapore Ministerial Conference represented business interests.45 Certain
reformist groups such as trade unions, environmental NGOs, and development NGOs
have generally come (a rather distant) second. Many other civic bodies, including most
grassroots associations, have had no direct entry to the WTO at all.
                                                 
44See, e.g., environmentalist complaints about purported inadequacies of the WTO Committee on
Trade and Environment: World Wide Fund for Nature, The WTO Committee on Trade and the
Environment - Is It Serious? (Geneva: WWF, 1996); Friends of the Earth, A Call to Close the
Committee on Trade and the Environment (A sterdam: FOE International, 1996).
45O'Brien, p. 77.
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Other inequalities in access have favoured organizations based in the North over
groups located in the South and the East. In class terms, civic contacts with the WTO
have principally involved urban-based, university-educated, computer-literate,
(relatively) high-earning English speakers. A few development NGOs have attempted
to incorporate 'voices from the base' into their advocacy work on the WTO, but for the
rest underclasses have been locked out of exchanges with the institution. The dialogue
has also shown a gender bias, with disproportionately large participation from men in
both the WTO staff and civic groups (especially business, academic and labour
associations).
A second major shortcoming in WTO-civil society relations to date has been their
overall shallowness. Although, as seen above, the WTO leadership has become
convinced in general terms of the importance of civil society in emergent global
governance, the organization has for the most part lacked clearly formulated objectives
and carefully constructed channels of communication for its interchanges with civic
groups. On the whole the WTO's engagement of civil society has occurred through
improvisation. Its External Relations Division has remained small, and its staff has
lacked expertise in respect of civil society. In contrast to the World Bank, the WTO
has established no liaison committee with civic groups. In contrast to the United
Nations, the WTO has made no arrangements for permanent accreditation of civic
organizations, as opposed to ad hoc admission to specific events. No civil society
associations have participated as ex officio observers on WTO committees. Nor have
civic groups been systematically involved in trade policy reviews or dispute settlement
procedures. To this extent the WTO has done little to bring civil society into
policymaking. Indeed, in contrast to the IMF and the World Bank, the WTO has given
civic associations no mention in its first annual reports.
Approaches from civil society towards the WTO have often suffered from similar
shallowness. Relatively few associations have – like the WEF, the ICFTU, Third
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World Network and the ICTSD – pursued sustained, focused, carefully researched
efforts to understand and shape WTO policies. Most civic groups with concerns about
global economic governance have shown only haphazard and superficial interest in the
WTO, becoming active only around a particular conference, set of negotiations, or
trade dispute.
A third general limitation in WTO-civil society relations – namely, a lack of veritable
'dialogue' – has mainly affected the institution's contacts with reformers and radicals.
These interchanges have often lacked sufficient openness and reciprocity, where the
WTO on the one hand and activists on the other are fully ready to listen to, learn from,
and be changed by each other. Such 'dialogues of the deaf' were particularly acute, for
example, in early contacts between free traders at the WTO and environmentalists who
automatically linked trade liberalization with increased environmental degradation.46
Exchanges between the WTO and reformist groups have tended to become more
cordial in the late 1990s. However, parties to WTO-civil society exchanges are still not
as prepared as they could be to consider positions other than their own.
In sum, relations between the WTO and civil society have to date often succumbed to
the potential dangers highlighted earlier. First, the exchanges have not been
democratically representative. On the contrary, they have tended to reinforce structural
inequalities in world politics. Second, on balance the WTO has not yet taken its
contacts with civil society that far beyond public relations exercises. Third, on the
whole civic groups have not provided the WTO with sufficient precisely formulated
and carefully researched inputs. Fourth, the WTO has not given careful thought to the
possible repercussions of its contacts with civil society on national and local politics in
its member countries. Fifth, the WTO has for the most part skewed its contacts toward
conformist groups, to the relative neglect of its reformist and radical critics, thereby
                                                 
46Williams, p. 110.
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obtaining an artificially optimistic assessment of the popularity and viability of its
policies.
To note shortfalls in relations between civil society and the WTO is not to advocate an
abolition of these links, of course. As stressed before, the dynamics of contemporary
governance are such that those exchanges are in effect irrepressible. We cannot return
to a Westphalian world where 'international organizations' dealt only with states. The
unavoidable challenge is therefore to forge relationships that maximize the
contributions of civil society to effective and democratic global governance.
Constraints
In order to prescribe measures for improved relations between civil society and the
WTO, one needs first to assess the causes of the problems. In a word, the shortfalls
just described have arisen primarily from resource limitations and deeper structural
forces. That is, the shortcomings in WTO-civil society relations have not resulted in
the first place from the personalities and attitudes of individual officials and lobbyists,
but from the political, economic and cultural context in which they work.
In terms of resources, the WTO has thus far lacked the personnel, funds, stores of
information and coordination capacities to realize the full potential of relations with
civil society. At present the organization has only a modest staff of about 500 to
handle a vast global trade agenda.47 (In comparison, the IMF currently employs
around 2600 persons, whereas the World Bank payroll nears 5500.48) In terms of
disposition, the professional staff of the WTO are overwhelmingly economists without
formal training in socio-political issues such as the organization and operations of civil
society. Meanwhile the WTO runs on a total administrative budget of less than $100
                                                 
47World Trade Organization, Annual Report 1996 (Geneva: WTO, 1996), vol. I, p. 153.
48http://www.imf.org/external/np/ext/facts/glance.htm; http://worldbank.org/html/extpb/annrep97/
admin.htm.
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million per annum, hardly a sum that allows for major overtures to civil society.49 (In
comparison, the World Bank operating budget is some $1375 million, while the IMF
travel budget alone currently amounts to $77 million.50) In v ew of these personnel
and funding limitations, it is not surprising that the WTO has accumulated little
information on civil society. Its staff are therefore usually very thinly briefly on the
civic groups that they meet. Nor has the organization developed any mechanisms to
coordinate its work on civic associations with national governments and other global
governance bodies that have more experience in these contacts.
In most cases, civic groups suffer from even more precarious resource situations than
the WTO. In terms of personnel, civil society organizations rarely have more than one
or two staff with detailed knowledge of the global trade regime. Major business
associations and certain think tanks have operated with fairly substantial and reliable
funding, but most trade unions and NGOs have worked on shoestring budgets and/or
short-term grants. Most civic groups have (partly owing to the inaccessibility of many
official documents) lacked sufficient data and analysis to mount fully informed
campaigns for policy change at the WTO. In addition, civil society groups have
developed few arrangements (aside from loose networking as seen in the PGA) to
exchange information on and coordinate lobbying of the WTO. As a result, the limited
resources of civil society have rarely been optimally employed.
That said, improved staffing, funding, information flows, and coordination would not
by themselves maximize the benefits of exchanges between civil society and the WTO.
Indeed, certain conditions of social structure have, if anything, stood as greater
barriers to a fuller development of the dialogue.
                                                 
49WTO, Annual Report 1996, p. 153.
50World Bank, Annual Report 1996 (Washington: The World Bank, 1996), p. 155; International
Monetary Fund, Annual Report 1997 (Washington: IMF, 1997), p. 226.
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For example, difficulties of access to the WTO for civic organizations have resulted in
part from the culture of secrecy that has traditionally enveloped both global economic
governance in general and global trade regulation in particular. Recent WTO moves
toward increased disclosure mark an important shift towards greater openness, but the
embedded culture of secrecy has slowed the process and is unlikely to dissolve quickly.
The previously described inequalities of civil society access to the WTO have also
reflected deeper structural conditions: in this case pervasive entrenched social
hierarchies in contemporary world politics between countries, classes and genders.
Such structures of subordination have figured centrally in producing a lower allocation
of resources and opportunities: to South-based civic organizations relative to North-
based groups; to labour unions relative to business associations; to women relative to
men; and indeed to civil society relative to official circles.
The power of neoclassical economic orthodoxy has been another important structural
force against a more inclusive, deeper and more open dialogue between the WTO and
civil society. So-called 'neoliberal' ideology has dominated social knowledge in the late
twentieth century, particularly following the dissolution of communist regimes and the
collapse of post-colonial socialism. In this situation of near-monopoly, ideas of market
rationality and comparative advantage have readily reigned as unquestioned truths, and
staff of the WTO have faced little pressure to give alternative perspectives a serious
hearing. This knowledge/power structure has put reformers and radicals at a marked
disadvantage in civil society relative to conformers.
A fourth structural inhibition to greater development of relations between the WTO
and civil society has been the persistent hold of the sovereignty norm. Although, as
indicated at the start of this paper, states have lost their effective capacity to exercise
sovereign governance, governments have continued to cling jealously to the claim that
they always have the complete and final say in regulation. Most civic activists and
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WTO officials, too, have continued to work under the spell of the sovereignty myth.
They have therefore generally directed their contacts firstly at states rather than at each
other, and both civic groups and the WTO have usually limited their direct exchanges
to an intensity that governments would tolerate.
Finally, and partly as an extension of the sovereignty issue, structural conditions have
limited dialogue between the WTO and civil society insofar as civic groups have
generally experienced difficulty establishing their legitimacy. In the Westphalian
international system to which contemporary globalization has brought an end, states
were normally regarded as the only legitimate actors in world politics. Today's post-
Westphalian situation allows for a multiplicity of agents, but nonstate entities must still
work hard to establish their credentials. Civil society associations can best secure their
legitimacy in terms of democratic practices; however, most civic groups have to date
attended insufficiently to questions concerning their representativeness, consultation
processes, transparency and accountability. Indeed, some of the organizations that
have pressed hardest for a democratization of the WTO have done little to secure
democracy in their own operations. This has allowed the WTO and states to take civil
society less seriously than they might otherwise have done.
In sum, then, a host of resource limitations and structural constraints have together
created substantial obstacles to the development of a wider and deeper dialogue
between civil society and the WTO. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the
contacts have had the partial, generally shallow, and often uneasy character described
earlier.
Toward the Future
Exchanges between the World Trade Organization and civil society have become a
notable feature of the global trade regime, much as civil society has become an
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important player in global governance generally. Civic groups have in the 1990s
undertaken a multitude of initiatives to reinforce, reshape or replace existing rules of
world trade. The WTO has responded with a larger number and variety of overtures
toward civil society than were ever seen under the GATT regime or before. The
dialogue between civic associations and the WTO continues to have significant
shortcomings, but most signs point to further growth of the involvement of civil
society in the global trade regime.
If – as seems probable – globalization continues at substantial rates into the next
century, then governance is likely to become increasingly quadrilateral, between
substate authorities, states, suprastate agencies, and civil society associations. As
indicated above, civic inputs can contribute greatly to policy efficacy and democracy in
this situation of multilayered governance. Yet such benefits do not accrue
automatically. It is understandable that the WTO and civil society have allowed the
early development of their relations to be largely haphazard and improvised. However,
the next phase requires more concerted and carefully constructed efforts. What sorts of
practicable measures are available to take relations between civil society and the WTO
forward in the short to medium term? Five general suggestions follow from the
analysis presented above.
In the first place, the parties can aim to clarify and specify their objectives. What, more
precisely, are they trying to achieve by engaging with each other? The WTO in
particular needs more explicit policy aims in regard to civil society.
Second, further steps can be taken formally to institutionalize relations between the
WTO and civil society. Drawing on the experience of other global governance
agencies, the WTO can devise mechanisms for permanent accreditation, observer
status in relevant committees and panels, a regular cycle of consultations (extending
the practice of the annual symposium with environmentalists), etc.
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Third, both the WTO and civil society can improve relevant staff capacities. For
example, the WTO could appoint several specially designated 'civil society liaison
officials'. Other relevant staff could take short training courses on relations with civic
groups, for example, as are currently being developed by the United Nations Staff
College in Turin. Likewise, more civil society capacity is needed – particularly among
marginalized groups – regarding the global trade regime.
Fourth, the parties can make more efforts to coordinate their activities in WTO-civil
society exchanges. For example, the WTO could join the 16 other global governance
agencies that subscribe to the UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service. It could also
exchange information and advice concerning civil society with other multilateral
institutions that have more experience in these relationships. Meanwhile civic groups
with interests in the global trade regime could do more in the way of exchanging
information, sharing tasks, coordinating initiatives, and so on.
Fifth, both civic organizers and WTO officials can consciously nurture attitudinal
changes that promote more constructive dialogue. For instance, all participants in the
relations can make more deliberate efforts to include otherwise marginalized circles.
The WTO and civic groups can also cultivate greater mutual recognition, respect and
reciprocity. In addition, both civil society organizations and the WTO can become
more sensitive to issues of their democratic accountability. To this end, all parties
could inter alia do more to publicize their activities to each other and to the wider
public.
None of the steps just described need be particularly costly or difficult. Given the
substantial benefits of well-developed WTO-civil society relations – in terms of
increasing information, stimulating debate, educating citizens, legitimating regimes,
and democratizing politics generally – such initiatives are surely worthwhile.
